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Ethics and the Use of Coercion in the Treatment of Psychiatric Patients
Abstract
Involuntary psychiatric treatment occurs under such conditions as the medicating or placing in treatment
facilities of patients without their consent. Such involuntary treatment has been litigated in the Supreme
Court; however, the Court’s rulings have been applied to incarcerated persons, with the notable exception
of the 1975 ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson, a case argued as a civil rights violation. Using O’Connor v.
Donaldson as a framework, this paper argues that forcing non- violent psychiatric patients to take
medication, or be otherwise treated against their will, is an unethical practice and must be discontinued.
This practice of forcible treatment violates the due process rights of patients, and is a violation of
accepted medical ethics.
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Jen Rushforth

Abstract
Involuntary psychiatric treatment occurs under such
conditions as the medicating or placing in treatment facilities of
patients without their consent. Such involuntary treatment has
been litigated in the Supreme Court; however, the Court’s
rulings have been applied to incarcerated persons, with the
notable exception of the 1975 ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson,
a case argued as a civil rights violation. Using O’Connor v.
Donaldson as a framework, this paper argues that forcing nonviolent psychiatric patients to take medication, or be otherwise
treated against their will, is an unethical practice and must be
discontinued. This practice of forcible treatment violates the due
process rights of patients, and is a violation of accepted medical
ethics.
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Introduction
Involuntary psychiatric treatment occurs when patients
are medicated, or placed in a treatment facility without their
consent. While involuntary treatment has been litigated before
the Supreme Court, with the exception of O'Connor v.
Donaldson (1975), which was argued as a civil rights violation,
the Court's rulings have been applied to incarcerated persons
(Washington v. Harper, 1990; Riggins v. Nevada, 1992; Sell v.
United States, 2003). Forcing non-violent psychiatric patients to
take medication against their will is an unethical practice and
should be discontinued.
Historical Overview of Mental Health and Involuntary
Treatment of Psychiatric Patients
For much of history, the treatments for mental illness
have been coercive and inhumane. For centuries, those who were
different, or socially unacceptable, were often accused of being
witches or possessed by demons. The most innocuous of
treatments was exorcism, in which priests attempted to vacate
evil spirits that had invaded the body, which was supposed to
cure the afflicted person. Trepanning, a practice in which a hole
was drilled into the skull, exposing the outermost layer of the
brain, was believed to release demons and cure various mental
illnesses, including schizophrenia. When shock was discovered
to alleviate symptoms, hydrotherapy—submerging patients in ice
water—was implemented as a treatment. A more advanced
technique, electroconvulsive therapy, consists of passing large
amounts of electric current through a person's brain in an attempt
to effect structural changes in the brain conducive to curing
certain psychological problems (Barlow & Durand, 2009).
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In the early twentieth century in the United States,
forced sexual sterilization was performed on those deemed
unsuitable to reproduce (Buck v. Bell, 1927). Carrie Buck was a
patient at the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded in
Virginia. Based on a state law passed in 1924, Buck was deemed
feeble-minded by heredity, and was ordered to undergo
sterilization. Buck appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis
that the forced sterilization order violated the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 The Court determined that Buck's due
process rights had not been violated, and that not extending the
sterilization statute to those outside state institutions did not
violate the equal protection clause. The Court upheld the
judgment forcing Buck to be sterilized, and ended with Justice
Holmes' famous rejoinder: “Three generations of imbeciles are
enough” (Buck v. Bell, 1927, p. 207). The right to procreate,
despite the ruling in Buck v. Bell, is one of the fundamental
rights, even though it is not written specifically in the text of
the Constitution (Chemerinksy, 2001).
Arguments in Favor of Ceasing Involuntary Treatment
of Psychiatric Patients
Case Law and Constitutional Rights
As citizens, certain rights and privileges are guaranteed
by the Constitution. Those pertinent to this topic include the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states “[n]o person
1	
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shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of the law” (U.S. Const., amend. V), has been used in
several cases to argue violations of due process in forcing
treatment upon patients. The Sixth Amendment arguments
generally used in the following cases relate to confronting
witnesses and having counsel. The right used to argue against
involuntary treatment in the Fourteenth Amendment is the equal
protection clause, which states that no state may “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws” (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1). Practically
speaking, the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment is essentially the same as the due process clause in
the Fifth Amendment, but protects persons specifically from the
states.
Since Buck v. Bell and the end of forced sterilization,
there have been several landmark cases relating to involuntary
treatment. The first such case was O'Connor v. Donaldson
(1975). Using the provisions set forth in the United States Code
for civil rights violations (42 U.S.C. § 1983), Kenneth
Donaldson brought the action against Dr. O'Connor, the
superintendent of the state mental facility in Florida in which he
had been civilly committed for fifteen years. Donaldson claimed
that O'Connor and his staff had intentionally deprived him of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to liberty. Donaldson proved he
had at no time been a danger to himself or to others, nor had he
received any treatment for any perceived mental illnesses.
O'Connor claimed that Florida state law allowed for the
indefinite confinement of the mentally ill, without necessarily
treating them or even allowing for their return to the community
if deemed to not be dangerous. The Supreme Court held that
THEMIS

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol2/iss1/6
DOI: 10.31979/THEMIS.2014.0206

4

Rushforth: Coercive Psychiatric Treatment

103
confining a harmless individual, who is able to survive freely in
the community on his own, or with the help of private persons,
on the basis of mental illness alone, is unconstitutional. Justice
Potter Stewart asserted that the state had an interest in “providing
care and assistance to the unfortunate,” but that mental illness
itself did not necessarily “disqualify a person from preferring his
home to the comforts of an institution” (O'Connor v. Donaldson,
1975, p. 575).
The first case dealing with the rights of prisoners was
Washington v. Harper (1990). Harper was serving a sentence in
Washington for a robbery of which he was convicted in 1976.
During his incarceration, Harper consented to the administration
of anti-psychotic drugs. While not medicated, he was often
violent, had been transferred to Washington's psychiatric prison
on multiple occasions, and he was finally diagnosed as suffering
from manic-depressive disorder. While there, Harper was forced
to take anti-psychotic drugs based on a policy that stated that an
inmate may be medicated against his will when ordered by a
psychiatrist, if he met the following criteria: “suffer[ing] from a
'mental disorder' and...'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of
serious harm' to himself or others” (Washington v. Harper, 1990,
p. 210). Harper filed a petition claiming that his forced
medication regime violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court denied the claim;
however, the State Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision, concluding that medication could only be forced upon
an inmate if the treatment was deemed medically necessary and
such treatment furthered a compelling state interest. During
litigation, the state ceased medicating Harper, but the Supreme
Court decided that the issue at hand was still relevant. The Court
held that an inmate who suffered from a severe mental illness
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and posed a danger to himself or others could be medicated
against his will if the treatment was in the inmate's best medical
interests. In such cases, this was not a violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment (Harper v. Washington,
1990).
The basis for Riggins v. Nevada (1992) was similar to
that of Harper. While awaiting trial for robbery and homicide,
Riggins began suffering from auditory hallucinations and
insomnia. A psychiatrist prescribed a powerful anti-psychotic
and Riggins was later found to be competent to stand trial.
Riggins moved to cease the administration of his anti-psychotic
regime for the duration of the trial so that he could present an
insanity defense. Riggins' argument was that the medication hid
his mental state, denying him his due process rights. His request
was denied and he was tried while still medicated. He still
presented an insanity defense, but was convicted and sentenced
to death. On appeal, the State Supreme Court held that expert
testimony was sufficient in describing the effects of antipsychotic drugs on Riggins and his conviction was upheld.
However, the Supreme Court maintained that for the state to
satisfy Riggins' due process concerns, they had to prove that
continuing his treatment was necessary and medically
appropriate. Since this was not done, and the Court could find no
compelling state interest in continuing to medicate Riggins, the
Court held that Nevada's treatment of Riggins violated his Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The decision of the Supreme
Court of Nevada was reversed, and Riggins' case was sent back
to a lower trial court to be retried in a way not inconsistent with
their findings (Riggins v. Nevada, 1992).
In Sell v. United States (2003), the petitioner, Sell, who
had a non-violent history of delusional disorders, was on trial in
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federal court for fraud and attempted murder. A Magistrate judge
found him competent to stand trial and released him on bail.
However, the Magistrate revoked Sell's bail when his condition
worsened. After his bail was revoked, Sell requested that his
competency to stand trial be reevaluated. Sell was examined by
psychiatrists at the United States Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners, was found incompetent to stand trial, and was ordered
to be hospitalized to determine when, or if, he would be capable
of standing trial. While hospitalized, Sell refused to take the antipsychotic drugs prescribed to him, and Medical Center officials
sought to have him forcibly medicated, a decision Sell appealed.
The Magistrate determined that Sell was a danger to himself and
others, and that medicating him was the only way to diminish his
dangerousness. The Magistrate also determined that the benefits
of medicating Sell outweighed the risks of any potential side
effects, and the regime of drug therapy proposed would likely
have the effect of returning Sell's competency, making it possible
for him to stand trial. Sell appealed to the District Court, who
found the Magistrate's determination of dangerousness
inaccurate, but affirmed his stance on drug therapy as an attempt
to return Sell's competency. The Supreme Court, as laid out in
prior cases (Washington v. Harper, 1990; Riggins v. Nevada,
1992), stated that the Constitution permits involuntary
administration of medication aimed at “render[ing] a mentally
ill defendant competent to stand trial on serious...charges
if...medically appropriate...substantially unlikely to have side
effects...undermin[ing] the trial's fairness, and, taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests” (Sell v. United
States, 2003, p. 167). However, this standard was rather high and
infrequently applied because of several stringent criteria required
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to meet the test. Using a strict scrutiny test, it must be
determined that forcing a defendant to take medication against
his will for the express purposes of making him competent to
stand trial achieves a vital and compelling government interest,
under which national security and similar interests would fall.
Other considerations must also be taken into account, such as a
defendant's confinement in an institution during the period of
time in which he is incompetent to stand trial, which would
protect the community from the defendant as well as depriving
the defendant of the same types of liberties normally lost during
incarceration (Sell v. United States, 2003).
As pointed out by mental health professionals who have
studied the Sell decision, the Court found itself weighing the
autonomy and liberties of the accused with that of the safety of
the community at large (Heilbrun & Kramer, 2005; Hunter,
Ritchie, & Spaulding, 2005), which is what trial courts are often
asked to balance. Hunter et al. (2005) pointed out two main
responses for mental health professionals in dealing with the Sell
decision: the consideration by clinicians of factors such as
context and environment when determining dangerousness, and
“the importance of providing [the] least restrictive services prior
to such interventions that violate patients' liberty interests”
(Hunter et al., 2005, p. 467). Sell, like Harper and Riggins,
related only to competency issues and the coercive treatment of
mentally ill defendants (Heilbrun & Kramer, 2005). However,
those who have analyzed Sell agreed that, as with nonpsychiatric defendants and inmates, violating the laws does
rescind some civil liberties, most notably freedom (Heilbrun &
Kramer, 2005; Hunter et al., 2005).
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Medical Ethics and the Freedom of Choice
Outside the realm of criminality, there appeared to be
multiple schools of thought on the use of coercion in treating the
mentally ill. Some stressed that patients need to be treated
respectfully and be allowed to make their own decisions
regarding their treatments with absolutely no coercion involved
(Heilbrun & Kramer, 2005). Others, however, found that
coercion was sometimes a necessity in dealing with certain types
of patients, and without the help of the judiciary, these patients
would never get the treatment they needed (Heilbrun & Kramer,
2005).
Civil liberties were not the only obstacles in the way of
coercive treatments. Connor (1996) explained that the
therapeutic value of psychiatric treatments, especially
psychotherapy, was negated when coercion was involved.
Successful psychotherapy required a high level of trust between
patient and therapist, and this trust cannot be garnered through a
forced relationship. According to Connor (1996), the outcome of
a patient's therapy was directly proportional to the relationship
that developed between patient and therapist.
Medical ethics naturally do not lend themselves to the
use of coercive treatment. The basic tenets of medical ethics
generally fall under the following four principles: patient
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice (Gillon,
1994). Patient autonomy essentially means respecting a patient's
right to choose which, if any, treatment option is best
considering the circumstances in which one finds oneself. The
foundation for patient autonomy is based on Emmanuel Kant's
ideal of respecting the person. The concepts of beneficence and
non-maleficence can be best explained to mean that healthcare
professionals, in this case psychiatrists, must do what is in the
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best interests of their patients, and they must also avoid harming
patients. Justice, the final of the four principles, includes
distributive justice, which relates to the allocation of healthcare
funding for various programs in a way that is as fair to as many
persons as possible (Gillon, 1994).
Chemerinsky (2001) explained that the right to make
one's own medical decisions is fundamental, including the right
to refuse treatment. Bassman (2005) posed the question “[a]re
there indisputable benefits to the individual and the community
that justify forcing people to relinquish their right to choice
because of assessments of mental illness and its often associated
implication of global incapacity?” (p. 488). This question was
philosophical, ethical, and political in nature. Bassman asserted,
much as Connor (1996) did before him, that coercion, and the
threat of force, is contrary to the nature of medicine and healing.
The threat of force will dissuade the mentally ill from seeking
treatment that may actually be beneficial to them (Bassman,
2005).
Arguments in Favor of Continued Coercive Treatments
for Psychiatric Patients
Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws
According to the Treatment Advocacy Center, a nonprofit organization based in Virginia, there are currently fortyfive states that have some version of an assisted outpatient
treatment law (Treatment Advocacy Center, 2011). The only
states that have no such laws are Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee (Treatment
Advocacy Center, 2011).
New York's outpatient treatment law is known as
Kendra's Law. Passed in 1999, the law lists four criteria by
THEMIS

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol2/iss1/6
DOI: 10.31979/THEMIS.2014.0206

10

Rushforth: Coercive Psychiatric Treatment

109
which a person can be placed into an assisted treatment program:
the patient must be at least eighteen years of age; suffering from
a mental illness; based on a clinician's assessment, be unable, or
unlikely to be able, to live in the community without some form
of non-private assistance; and have a history of refusing
psychiatric treatment. The patient must also be likely to benefit
from an assisted treatment program (New York Mental Hygiene
Law ch. 27 title B § 9.60).
While at first it may appear as though assisted treatment
laws are at odds with the various Supreme Court rulings related
to forcible treatments, such as Washington, Riggins, and Sell,
that is not the case. Each of the aforementioned cases are
specifically related to defendants awaiting trial, in the case of
Harper and Sell, or a specific due process violation during the
trial phase of a convicted prisoner in the case of Riggins. The
closest to the case law these treatment laws come is the
O'Connor case, in which Donaldson was civilly committed to a
mental institution for nearly fifteen years. However, there are
significant differences between assisted treatment laws and the
O'Connor case. Donaldson was not actually treated in any way
for a mental illness, whereas the purpose of Kendra's Law is to
treat severely mentally ill persons.
However, as Chemerinsky (2001) stated, freedom and
liberty are fundamental rights, as is control over one's medical
decisions, including refusal of treatment. Perlin (2003), in his
study of Kendra's Law, determined that it violates the rights of
individuals who have committed no crime. Kendra's Law
violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
protecting against the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property”
(U.S. Const., amend. V).
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The Necessity of Coercion in the Treatment of Certain
Psychiatric Patients
As noted in Heilbrun and Kramer (2005), a segment of
mental health professionals have claimed that a certain degree of
coercion is necessary in treating certain patients, who, without
the assistance of the judiciary, would likely attempt to remain
untreated. However, coercion in the absence of proof of
dangerousness and criminality is antithetical to the very nature of
a free society and the fundamental rights therein. The therapeutic
value of psychiatric treatments, especially psychotherapy, are
negated when coercion is involved (Connor, 1996). Successful
psychotherapy requires a high level of trust between patient and
therapist, and this trust cannot be garnered through a forced
relationship (Connor, 1996). Therefore, coercion is not a valid,
reliable, or ethical technique to employ in the pursuit of treating
any patients.
Conclusion
Coercive treatments for mental illnesses did not cease as
the modern era dawned. The topic of coercive and involuntary
treatment of psychiatric patients remains relevant today. The
fundamental rights relating to personal autonomy in medical
decisions are not absolute in all circumstances, as recent case
law makes clear (Washington v. Harper, 1990; Riggins v.
Nevada, 1992; Sell v. United States, 2003). In relation to
criminal defendants and prisoners, the distinction of being a
danger to oneself or to others is an important factor in
determining the constitutionality of medicating a patient against
one’s will (Washington v. Harper, 1990; Sell v. United States,
2003). The prevalence of assisted outpatient treatment laws, such
as Kendra's Law in New York, suggests this is a problem that
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will continue for some time. Given the opinions of the Supreme
Court on the matter, and the assertion by many mental health
professionals that coercion and the threat of force actually
hamper the possibility of recovery in relation to mental illnesses
(Connor, 1996; Bassman, 2005), as well as the fundamental
rights that live on in the Constitution (Chemerinsky, 2001), it is
clear that, without the presence of violence or dangerousness,
patients should not be forced to be treated without their consent.
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